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natural children and would be classed with them unless by will or
some other instrument they were excluded. In the principal case, the
court stated that the 1950 statute, if it were used to determine the
intention of the testator, would allow adopted children to be included
within the term "heirs-at-law" of the adoptive parents.
It was contended, however, that since the testator died in 1904,
the holding in Copeland v. State Bank & Trust Co." controlled the
principal case, and the statute in effect at the testator's death should
be used to determine membership in the class described as "heirs."
The court, however, refused to follow this part of the Copeland
12
opinion, and held that in determining membership in the class de-
scribed as "heirs" of the life tenant, the statute in effect at the death
of the life tenant would control. Therefore, since the life tenant in
the principal case died in 1952, the 1950 statute, in effect at her death,
was used to construe the will, and the adopted children were allowed
to share in the property left by the testator. By the specific holding
in the principal case the court was not compelled to use the 1904
statute and its opposing rules of construction.
The case represents an important clarification on the status of
adopted children, in accepting what is believed to be the preferable
definition of the terms "heirs" and "heirs-at-law" as including adopted
children. It would now seem that the 1904 statute with its contrary
rules of construction is at long last dead. No longer can it plague the
adopted child as it has since its enactment, and no longer will it rule
from the grave as it has since its repeal.
JAms T. YOUNGBLOOD
TESTAMENTARY GIFTS TO AMENDABLE TRUSTS
The question of whether a testator can ever devise or bequeath a
portion of his estate to an amendable inter vivos trust is not one that
can be readily and conclusively answered. When the bequest is to an
amendable trust which has in fact been amended subsequent to the
execution of the will, a further and even more perplexing problem
arises. No American jurisdiction has as yet allowed property to pass
into a trust which has been amended after the execution of the will,
unless such amendments meet the formal requirements of the Statute
of Wills. It has been suggested that perhaps the law in this respect
should be changed by passing a statute allowing a formally executed
1300 Ky. 432, 188 S.W. 2d 1017 (1945).
Supra note 1 at 508.
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will to incorporate by appropriate reference a trust instrument, to-
gether with its subsequent amendments, although neither the trust
nor its amendments comply with the formalities required of a will.'
The purpose of this note is to review the treatment by the courts of
bequests to inter vivos trusts, and to make such recommendations con-
cerning amendable and subsequently amended trusts that are con-
sidered necessary. Discussion will be centered upon the theories
that may be used to sustain testamentary gifts to trusts and the prob-
lems that arise where the trust is (1) irrevocable and unamendable,
(2) revocable and amendable but has not been amended and (3)
revocable and amendable where there has been a subsequent amend-
ment.
Irrevocable and Unamendable Trusts: In cases involving an ir-
revocable and non-amendable trust to which the testator attempts to
"pour over" or devise a part of his estate on his death, there appear
to be no serious problems. This can be accomplished in most jurisdic-
tions through the doctrine of incorporation by reference.2 Under this
doctrine, a writing not attested and subscribed in conformity with the
Statute of Wills can be included in a will if the will refers to the
writing as one then in existence, shows an intention to incorporate the
instrument, and the reference identifies the writing with certainty.3
Under the incorporation by reference doctrine the incorporated docu-
ment is considered a part of the will for certain purposes only, usually
for construction purposes and for applying the will's provisions to per-
sons and things.4 Although the document must be in existence and
referred to in the will as being in existence, it does not have to be
present at the time of the execution of the will, 5 and need not be pro-
bated with the will proper.6
In those jurisdictions that do not recognize the doctrine of incorpo-
ration by reference, another possible way by which such a bequest
can be upheld is through the application of the "independent sig-
nificance" theory. This theory has arisen due to the inescapable fact
that to interpret the language of a will, it is usually necessary to relate
'Palmer, Testamentary Disposition to the Trustee of an Inter Vivos Trust, 50
Micr. L. REv. 33 (1951).
' 1 Scorr, TRUSTS 336-37 (1939).
ATlNsON, WILS 387-90 (1953). The doctrine of incorporation by reference
should be distinguished from the process of integration. Though the two doctrines
are different, they do overlap to a certain extent. When papers are integrated
into a will, they must be present at the time of the execution of the will and be-
come a part of the will in the fullest sense including probation with the will.
SATmnNSON, WILLS 385 (1953); 1 PAGE, WILLS 522 (Lifetime Ed. 1941).
'A'rxNsoN, WILLS 385 (1953); In re Willey's Estate 128 Cal. 1, 60 Pac. 471
(1900).
62 PAGE, WILs 67 (Lifetime Ed. 1941).
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the language to extrinsic facts. It is permissible for the testator to
make the designation of the beneficiaries or the amount of the devises
or bequests dependent upon future acts which have independent sig-
nificance, that is, are non-testamentary or have effect apart from and
independent of the disposition of the property by the will. 7 This
theory is subject to the objection that the testator might alter his will
by an unattested act, but certainly this objection would not be valid
where the testator refers to his past act for the purpose of identifying
the beneficiary. Professor Scott says:
If by deed a valid trust was created prior to the execution of the will
and the settlor reserved no power to revoke or modify the trust, it
seems clear that, on one or both of the two grounds suggested [in-
corporation by reference, or ascertaining the terms of the will from
facts having independent significance], the testamentary trust can be
upheld.-
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that where the inter
vivos trust is irrevocable and unamendable a person can make ad-
ditions to the trust by referring to that trust in his will without
setting out the detailed terms of the trust.
Amendable Trusts not in fact amended: Where the trust instrument
reserves to the settlor a power to amend or revoke, a more difficult
problem arises. Even though an amendable trust has not in fact been
amended after the will was executed there is confusion as to whether
it will be permitted to be incorporated by the will. Though consider-
able authority supports the affirmative, some of the decisions are of
limited value. For example, in two cases often cited as upholding the
incorporation of an amendable trust, the courts did not discuss the
issues raised by the fact that the trusts were revocable.9 Perhaps the
strongest support for upholding the incorporation of amendable trusts
can be found in several Ohio decisions. 10 Although these cases have
been stated to be of no authority on the point outside of Ohio, since
the cases are based on an Ohio statute,". but an examination of the
statute 2 reveals that it is essentially the same as the common law
'ATrmnsoN, Wres 340 (1937); Evans, Incorporation by Reference, Integra-
tion and Non-Testamentary Act, 25 COL. L. Itv. 879 at 895 (1925).
'1 ScoTT, Tnusrs 293, 294 (1939).9 Swetland v. Swetland, 102 N.J. Eq. 294, 140 At. 279 (1928); In re Willey's
Estate, 128 Cal. 1, 60 Pac. 471 (1900).
" First-Central Trust Co. v. Claflin, 73 N.E. 2d 388 (Ohio 1947); Fifth-
Third Union Trust Co. v. Wilensky, 79 Ohio App. 73, 70 N.E. 2d 920 (1946);
Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio 195, 58 N.E. 2d 381 (1944); Koeninger v.
Toledo Trust Co., 49 Ohio App. 490, 197 N.E. 419 (1934).
' Lauritzen, Can a Revocable Trust Be Incorporated by Reference? 45 ILL. L.
REv. 583 at 599 (1950).
'PAG-E, Ohio Gen. Code Sec. 10504-4 (1938). A document, book, record
or memorandum in actual existence may, by reference, be incorporated in a will,
if referred to as being actually in existence at the time the will is executed....
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rules on incorporation by reference and therefore the problem in
Ohio is essentially the same in that state as elsewhere. The Ohio
courts seem to regard the reference to a trust as a reference to an
existing writing even though the trust is subject to amendment.
13
Further support can be found in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleve-
land,14 from which it can be inferred that it is irrelevant that power to
amend is reserved so long as no amendments have been made after
the execution of the will. If subsequent amendments are made, such
amendments will not invalidate the whole residuary bequest but
these amendments will be void as to the property passing under the
residuary clause and the residue will pass to the trust as it existed
when the will was executed. This case involved an amendable trust,
subsequently amended, in which the trustees paid out of the original
trust estate all the amounts specified in the second paragraph, which
was the paragraph subsequently amended by the testator. The court
held that these beneficiaries were not entitled to share in the residue
of the estate, since that amount was to pass to the beneficiaries named
in the other section of the original trust deed which remained un-
changed.
On the other hand, strong authority can be found against up-
holding a bequest to an amendable trust. In Atwood v. Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Co.15 where the testator devised property to an amend-
able trust and subsequently amended the trust, but the effect of the
amendments was not in issue. The court held against the validity of
the residuary disposition upon the ground that the settlor had re-
served the power to amend and not upon the fact that the power to
amend had been exercised after the execution of the will. Support
for the position taken in the Atwood case can be found in Boal v.
Metropolitan Museum of Art,' 6 and President and Directors of Man-
hatten Co. v. Janowitz.
17
Writers discussing the problems of incorporating amendable trusts
have further indicated the lack of harmony in this area of the law.
Scott, in discussing the Atwood case, said that the decision there was
Supra Note 1 at 45.
14291 Mass. 880, 196 N.E. 920 (1935).
275 Fed. 513 (1st. Cir. 1921).18298 Fed. 894 (2nd. Cir. 1924). Held incorporation invalid because testator
had attempted to create for himself a power to dispose of his residuary estate
otherwise than by an instrument executed as a will or codicil.
17260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S. 2d 232 (1940). The court here points out
the difference between a revocable and non-revocable trust. If non-revocable, the
trust instrument is fixed and enduring and can be incorporated. If revocable, the
disposition of the property would be made by the shifting provisions of the trust
instrument. To allow the incorporation here would permit the testator to alter his
will by an instrument not executed as required by the statute of will.
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contrary to the weight of authority.' 8 Another writer states ".... that
the weight of authority established by the American courts which have
most carefully considered the problem rejects the incorporation of
revocable trusts into wills."19 The writer of this paper feels that per-
haps the majority view, and certainly the trend, is to uphold a bequest
to an amendable trust where the terms of the trust have not been
subsequently amended.
Amendable trusts where there is a subsequent amendment: Where
the trust is amendable and there have been subsequent amendments,
one line of cases has disregarded the amendments unless executed
with the formalities required of a will. The trust instrument is given
effect according to its original terms, or in the form that it took at the
time the will was executed.20 Other courts have invalidated such
residuary bequests altogether where there have been amendments to
the trust after the execution of the will. In such event the property
passes by intestacy.
21
The problems which arise where there is an amendment to the
trust after the execution of the will can be avoided by executing a
codicil to the will after the amendment to the trust, providing there
are no other amendments after the date of the codicil, since the will
speaks from that date.22 Also these problems can be avoided if the
amendments to the trust have been executed in such a manner as to
satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Wills, even though the in-
struments themselves are not in the form of a will. There is a recent
Kentucky case holding that such formally executed amendments are a
valid part of the will. 23 The basis for the holding in this case is not
clear, but it is submitted that the decision is sound. The court ex-
pressly stated that the holding was not based on the "independent
significance" theory.24 To give effect to these amendments is clearly
outside the scope of the doctrine of incorporation by reference since
(1) the amendments were made after the execution of the will, and
(2) the trust, as it was enforced, was clearly not in existence at the
time the will was executed. Though the court did not expressly refer
to the amendments as codicils, they were perhaps treated as such.
1 ScoT'r, TRusrs 297 (1939).
'Lauritzen, Can A Revocable Trust Be Incorporated By Reference? 45 ILL.
L. REv. 583 at 600 (1950).
'Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935);
Koeninger v. Toledo Trust Co., 49 Ohio App. 490, 197 N.E. 419 (1934); Note,
157 A.L.R. 1164 (1945).
'Atkinson, Wills 393 (1953). Pres. and Directors of Manhatten Co. v.
Janowitz, 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S. 2d 232 (1940).
'In Re Yorks Estate, 95 N.H. 435, 65 A. 2d 282 (1949); First-Central Trust
Co. v. Claflin, 73 N.E. 2d 388 (Ohio 1947).
' Stouse v. First National Bank of Chicago, 245 S.W. 2d 914 (Ky. 1951).
2Id. at 920.
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There seems to be no valid objection to upholding such formally
executed amendments, since the spirit of the Statute of Wills has been
complied with.
Subsequent amendments to the trust can possibly be upheld upon
the "independent significance" theory, though to the writer's knowl-
edge there have been no cases sustaining a bequest on this ground.
A strong argument against applying this theory is the difficulty of
determining when the act is non-testamentary. In support of its ap-
plication to this situation an analogy can be made to other instances
in which the doctrine has been applied. Bequests have been sustained
"to such persons as shall be in my employ at the time of my death,"25
and in instances where the testator bequeaths property in a certain
house, room or receptacle.26 By shifting the contents after the execu-
tion of the will, the testator can change the disposition of his property.
It is possible that at the time he executed the will he could have had
such a proposition in mind, and made such a disposition in order to
circumvent the Statute of Wills. This point is not often considered in
the cases and it is perhaps enough to say that such bequests are upheld
because normally the acts referred to have significance apart from
testamentary purposes. Though it is possible to argue that the act of
amending an inter vivos trust can have independent significance, it is
concededly difficult to determine when such an act is non-testamentary,
and perhaps the courts are wise in not extending the doctrine to such
a situation.
Noting the apparent lack of uniformity and the areas of uncer-
tainty in the handling of bequests to amendable inter vivos trusts, one
writer has concluded that there is need of legislation, and suggests the
following:
A devise or bequest in a duly executed will shall not be invalid for
lack of compliance with sections (the sections pertaining to the
formalities of execution of a will) where it is made in form or in sub-
stance to the trustee of a trust established in writing during the
testator's lifetime; nor shall it be invalid because the trust may be
amended or revoked or both by the settlor or any other person or
persons; nor because the trust was amended after execution of the
will. The devise or bequest may operate to dispose of property on
the terms of the trust as they appear in writing at the testator's death,
except, that any writing prepared after execution of the will which
would have the sole effect of disposing of property at death shall be
disregarded'
In re Hirshorn's Estate, 120 Colo. 294, 209 P. 2d 543 (1949); Reinheimer's
Estate, 265 Pa. 185, 108 Atl. 412 (1919); Abbot v. Lewis, 77 N.H. 94, 88 AtI.
98 (1913).
'Buchwald v. Buchwald, 175 Md. 103, 199 AUt. 795 (1938); Hastings v.
Bridge, 86 N.H. 247, 166 Atl. 273 K1933); Gaff v. Cornwallis, 219 Mass. 226, 106
N.E. 860 (1914); Creamer v. Harris, 90 Ohio St. 160, 106 N.E. 967 (1914).' Supra Note 1 at 67-68.
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This statute would liberalize the law as it now stands. It would allow
the courts to uphold the residuary bequests according to the terms of
subsequent amendments upon a determination by the court that the
amendment was not a testamentary act but had significance inde-
pendent of disposing of the estate owned at death.
Such a statute would be useful, and in this writer's opinion sets
forth a desired proposition, in that it would uphold bequests to an
amendable and revocable trust where the trust has not been amended
after the execution of the will.
In upholding subsequent amendments that were not made for the
sole purpose of disposing of property at death, perhaps the statute goes
too far. When the subsequent amendments are simply to add bene-
ficaries to share in the trust, and where the disposition provided for
in the amendments can be satisfied solely out of the original trust
corpus, then such amendments should be allowed as this would in no
way violate the Statute of Wills. Where the disposition provided for
in the amendment must be satisfied out of any of the property passing
to the trust under the provisions of the will, then the amendments
should not be upheld unless executed with such formalities as would
satisfy the Statute of Wills. To extend the "independent significance"
doctrine to this situation, as suggested by the statute, would accom-
plish no real purpose since there would be but few instances in
which subsequent amendments to trusts would have an effect inde-
pendent of disposing of property at death. The burden on the courts
in making such determinations, and the possible opportunity it would
afford for the eventual evasion of the Statute of Wills by declaring
various acts to have a non-testamentary effect, outweigh the possible
good to be gained by such an extension.
The Statute of Wills was designed for the protection of those who
dispose of their property by will. Compliance with its provisions af-
fords a degree of protection against fraud, undue influence, whimsical
change, etc. Therefore until such a need to dispense with the statutory
requirements becomes evident by the changing conditions of society,
it is believed desirable to insist that such requirements be met. Be-
quests to amendable and revocable trusts should be upheld where
there are no amendments after the execution of the will, but subsequent
amendments not executed with formalities that would satisfy the
Statute of Wills should be held invalid.
CONLEY G. Wn=ERSON
